European officials are discussing the possibility of including the cancellation (full or partial) of tourist Schengen visas for Russians in the next package of sanctions, based on the fact that what is happening is not the work of Putin alone, but of the entire Russian people. Leaders of the Russian opposition in exile opposed this measure, insisting that it is not right to equate all Russians with Putin's supporters, the country of Russia with its current political regime.
Pre-installed Submissiveness
Each side has its own perspective. The EU says the special military operation is the "war of all Russians," not just Putin. There is a logical trap here: this is exactly what the Russian autocrat claims in his speeches — all Russian citizens are united in supporting the party and government in their existential confrontation with the West. It turns out that the authors of the visa restriction idea are in solidarity with Putin.
The truth is that dictatorship is always a tango for two. Without the masses, without the crowd, the dictator does not exist. An autocrat by definition must be "popular." However, part of the population's support for Putin, the regime, and the "special operation" is simulated because people need to survive in circumstances of an almost totalitarian regime that requires absolute and active obedience, pre-installed submissiveness, what was called in the 1930s-1940s Gleichschaltung. Obedience can be feigned, but the result is a "spiral of silence," an impression of a truly large-scale support for the political system. 80+ percent approval of Putin's activities is impressive. But it must be understood that support for the authorities is socially approved, and in some social groups, it is the only behavior. And within the large and impressive sociological indicator lies a multilayered range of human, very human, feelings — primarily the desire for social mimicry for survival in inexplicable and dangerous external circumstances. To assess social moods, numerous other questions are attached to the big question of approval. Leading Russian sociologists estimate active, aggressive, sincere support for the regime, its leader, its initiatives, its special military operation in a fifth of the population. The rest are hesitant, changing their point of view depending on circumstances.
Are other nations not like this? Poles, who yesterday voted for moderate liberals, and today chose a nationalist-conservative as president? Are Americans not like this, who preferred Trump for the second time? Are all Poles by this criterion nationalist-conservatives? Are all Americans Trumpists? Of course not, everything is much more complicated. Are the French not like this, who in the summer 2024 elections voted for the far-right in the first round, and then, when many were persuaded in a matter of days, voted for the far-left? Inconsistency, irrationality, opportunism are inherent properties of mass psychology.
Another argument. Why did Russians not use all their opportunities to change the power in the country? The reproach seems logical. But they tried to change it, and in quite legal ways. They took to the streets. Participated in unfree elections. The active minority fought but did not become the majority. They lost. And now the moment is missed. But a counter-question is possible. Why did the residents of Riga, Vilnius, or Tallinn not take to the streets during the Soviet years to change this very power? Why, as in the metropolis, was everything limited to the underground activities of a few dozen dissidents? The answer is there was no opportunity in those conditions. And the main mass, as always and everywhere, was passive, trying not to attract trouble. And this opportunity for mass effective resistance — at an unimaginable level of repressiveness of the Putin system for Europeans — does not exist in Russia now.
The Kremlin as a Beneficiary
There is another motive often mentioned by supporters of visa restrictions — being punished so harshly, Russians will see the light and turn their anger on the "root cause" of their troubles, that is, the current Russian political regime. The dynamics of public sentiment over the last decade show that everything happens in exactly the opposite way. Firstly, the main mass of the population blames not their own government for their troubles, but precisely an external force, the West, and internal enemies. Secondly, the standard reaction to troubles is not public expression of discontent, which is both physically dangerous and does not change anything in the system's structure, but adaptation, the search for pragmatic solutions to emerging problems. In practical terms, visa restrictions, if they turn out to be incomplete, will certainly reduce the flow of Russians visiting Europe, but will increase the scale of the "black market" of intermediaries in obtaining visas. Yes, an ordinary Russian, feeling like a Russian European, will no longer get into the cathedrals and museums of European capitals, but indifferent Putinists, visiting Europe or living in it on various grounds, will not go anywhere — only because they are wealthy.
And Putin and his political class will not be harmed by these restrictions in any way. They are not noticeable to them. Meanwhile, the Kremlin will become the beneficiary of this story. Because visa restrictions are a way to increase the number of Europe's adversaries within the Russian population. Putin does not need to close the borders. The Europeans themselves will do this part of the work, which he definitely thought about himself. A wonderful gift to the regime — to close the door to the world for Russians from outside.
No one has canceled the Stockholm syndrome — citizens began to rally around Putin and note the "benefit" of sanctions for the native economy starting from 2014, and in the case of additional isolation from Europe, they will rally around the Kremlin, which once was not at all native to them, even more thoroughly. Many of those who still doubted Putin's rightness, including historical and ethical rightness, will stop doubting.
And it is the pro-Western and pro-democratic-minded citizens of Russia who will be the ones to suffer and be locked in the country. And even so, Western bureaucracy did not pay much attention to the problems of political prisoners and those journalists, lawyers, sociologists, doctors, teachers, scientists, students who still resist the regime, and now they will be left alone with a cruel political system. It should not be forgotten that this system has two fronts — external, military, and internal, repressive. It turns out that unpleasant Russian tourists, who cannot string two words together in the countries they visit, are equated by visa restrictions with pro-democratically minded Russians. And what about those who are in prison, who continue to fight the regime inside Russia? And newborns or children of school and student age, are they also responsible for Putin? And conscripts fleeing the state, including because they do not want to kill...
The internal front will not be closed when the hot phase of external confrontation ends. Here are the data from the OVD-info website, which, alas, change towards an increase almost every day: as of September 12, 2025, 3,853 defendants in politically motivated criminal cases were being prosecuted (only criminal!); 1,687 of them were in places of detention. These people are imprisoned for Ukraine. For the fact that they are true patriots of Russia, not the Russian regime. They are imprisoned because they were burned with shame for what the Russian authorities are doing. Just as Soviet dissidents were burned with shame for their government. The regime glorifies Stalin and destroys the memory of Stalinist repressions — and before this internal war, everyone is united: both exiled Poles and Lithuanians, and dispossessed, and repressed... Siberia and Kolyma are a common side of the barricades. Today's Russian dissidents, human rights activists, lawyers, journalists are direct heirs of those whom the Stalinist regime destroyed, and then the late Soviet system persecuted.
And Again: Guilt and Responsibility
Oh, this unending and inevitable question of collective responsibility and collective guilt! The fierce discussions of today's Russians are just a faint echo of the past reflection of the best European minds on this topic. And not only past. Why was the Polish nation offended and divided when, after Jan Tomasz Gross's book "Neighbors," after journalistic investigations, after Stanislaw Pasikowski's film "The Harvest" and Pawel Pawlikowski's film "Ida," a conversation began about the nature of Polish responsibility for the massive and brutal Jewish pogroms (both during the war and after it, although there were almost no Jews left)? Because it wanted to remain in the status of a victim, on the side of good. Like any nation in similar circumstances. In favor of Polish society speaks the fact that a public discussion about this very responsibility unfolded within it. This is a mature society capable of reflection, self-knowledge, feeling guilt, and acknowledging it.
So does this mean that in light of proven facts ALL Poles should be held responsible for the Holocaust? Of course not. Just like ALL Lithuanians after the facts presented in Ruta Vanagaite's book "Our People"? Facts that are not disputed, but from which many turn away. No. Because guilt is individual. Because it is not only a moral but also a legal concept. If everyone is guilty, then no one is guilty, wrote Hannah Arendt.
Responsibility, on the other hand, according to Karl Jaspers, "metaphysical guilt" — is something else. It is what should burn from within. If it does not burn — there is a deal with conscience, a retreat into the "fetal position": I knew nothing and know nothing, do not want to know, do not touch me. This is infantile behavior. But it is characteristic of huge masses of adults. Precisely masses, because avoidance of responsibility is a phenomenon not only of individual but also of mass psychology.
Collective responsibility is what Thomas, Heinrich, and Klaus Mann wrote about, what Karl Jaspers dealt with. This problem cannot be solved by "punishment" in the form of canceling the issuance of Schengen visas. This is Dante's version of hell, this is what the nation will have to deal with on its own. And what, it must be admitted, a significant part of it avoids. This is what irritates European officials and the political class.
European Russia
The possible EU decision is pressured by history: fear of Russian expansion, the burden of 1939, 1940, the post-war years of establishing Sovietized regimes in Eastern Europe. This is a historically conditioned feeling of constant threats. But a closed Europe, by the very fact of isolation, will worsen political morals in Russia and these threats will only worsen in the long term. An open Europe has always softened them. If the West wants to have a side for negotiations and human exchanges after Putin, if it wants a peaceful and normal Russia — it needs to leave windows for contacts. First of all, with young people. It is no coincidence that the Kremlin is fighting with all its might against quality education — secondary and higher. So that after Putin, there is no intellectual and moral desert on the territory of Russia, the European Union must be open first of all to young Russians.
Europe in the last decades of Soviet power was a model of the life to strive for. In a sense, even today European responsibility is to attract by example. To enlighten and educate, to preserve the remnants of European Russia — through people, not repelling, but attracting them. Europe is in people, who should not be locked up. Who should be shown: everything the authorities and television say about the West is a lie from beginning to end.
Yes, it is difficult for Europe to reproach itself: it gave Russia everything it could — from open borders and education to direct investments and technologies. But an isolated Europe from Russia is also not complete. If Russia does not return to Europe, it will become a constant threat to the West. There is still a chance not to lose people for the future — Russian Europeans.
* Andrey Kolesnikov is considered a "foreign agent" by the Russian Ministry of Justice.
© Photo: E. Averyanova/"Zvezda", Shutterstock/FOTODOM.